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In this paper, we consider a pricing decision problem with two competing supply
chains which distribute differentiated but competing products in the same market.
Each chain can be vertically integrated or decentralized based on the choice of the
manufacturer. The manufacturing costs, sales costs and consumer demands are
characterized as uncertain variables, whose distributions are estimated by experienced
experts. Meanwhile, uncertainty theory and game theory are employed to formulate
the pricing decision problems. The equilibrium behaviors (how the supply chain
members make their own pricing decisions on wholesale prices and retailer markups)
at operational level under three possible scenarios are derived. Numerical experiments
are also given to explore the impacts of the parameters’ uncertain degrees on supply
chain members’ pricing decisions. The results demonstrate that the supply chain
uncertain factors have great influences on equilibrium prices. In addition, we also
evaluate the effects of competing intensity (substitutability) of the two products on the
strategy behaviors, vertically integrated channel strategy versus decentralized strategy,
of the manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturers are better off to distribute their
products through a decentralized channel rather than an integrated one when the
substitutability is greater than some value. Besides, the uncertain factors in the supply
chain might reduce the value contrast to the one in deterministic case. Some other
interesting managerial highlights are also provided in this paper.
Keywords: Pricing, Two-echelon supply chain, Game theory, Channel structure,
Uncertain variable
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate a pricing competition problem in some special competing
supply chains in which differentiated but substitutable products are sold into the same
market. These competing supply chains often consist of only a few upstream manufac-
turers, each of which distributes its products through exclusive downstream outlets who
usually carry only one product line. This exclusive dealership is not uncommon in indus-
tries like petrol, automobiles, some electronic products, softdrinks, fastfoods, and so on.
For instance, a petrol gas station often retails gasolines from some certain oil producer,
and a 4S store usually carries some certain car brand or cars from a specific manufacturer.
For convenience, we use “manufacturer” to represent the upstream firm and “retailer” to
the downstream channel participant in the following discussion.
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Motivation
Nowadays, hi-tech products, e.g., digital devices, are often updated quickly. The demands
and costs of these products, especially of new products, are usually with no historical
data. Even though sometimes the historical data may be available, it may not be applicable
due to the highly changeable markets. In these cases, we have to rely on belief degrees
given by experiencedmanagers and experts. Surveys have indicated, however, that human
beings usually estimate a much wider range of values than they actually take. Therefore,
human belief degree should not be treated as random variable or fuzzy variable. When
some indeterminate phenomena, expressed by human language like “approximately 4000”
or “high costs”, behave neither randomness nor fuzziness, uncertainty theory, initiated
by Liu [1] and refined by Liu [2] based on normality, duality, subadditivity, and product
axioms, is a legitimate approach to dealing with circumstances where only belief degree
is available.
This paper focuses on the pricing decisions of the two substitutable products dis-
tributed by two totally separate supply chains. More specially, the products’ demands
and costs are characterized as uncertain variables whose distributions are estimated by
belief degrees. How should the supply chain members make their own pricing deci-
sions on wholesale prices and retailer markups with uncertain demands and costs? What
effects might the parameters’ uncertain degrees (decided by the available information and
experts’ preference) have on supply chain members’ pricing decisions? How do uncer-
tainties and competing intensity (substitutability) between the two products affect the
duopoly manufacturers’ strategy behaviors, in vertically integrated channel structures
versus decentralized structures?
In order to cover these problems, uncertainty-theory-based and game-theory-based
models are employed to derive the optimal equilibria in different scenarios. Numerical
experiments are also given to explore the effects and strategies.
Literature Review
By now, considerable attentions have been focused on the pricing competition in totally
separate chains as mentioned both from scholars and practitioners. McGuire and Staelin
[3] initiated the research and investigated the effects of the substitutability on the struc-
ture strategies in duopoly supply chains where each manufacturer distributes its goods
through a single exclusive retailer. Coughlan [4] tested results that integration of the mar-
keting functions results in greater pricing competition and lower prices than the use of
independent marketing middlemen by survey data from the international semiconductor
industry. Recently, Anderson and Bao [5] extended the model of Coughlan [4] from two
entirely separate chains to amore general context with arbitrary competing supply chains,
and also demonstrated that the underlying market shares play a very important role on
the equilibrium behaviors. Li and Li [6] studied the two sustainable supply chains under
competition in product sustainability under different structures.
The work above has typically focused on deterministic demands and costs. In fact,
the real world has many indeterminate factors which cannot be ignored when mak-
ing pricing decisions. Those indeterminacies, such as material costs, customer incomes,
workers’ expenses and technology improvements, usually affect the manufacturing costs
and consumer demands. Some of them can be described as random variables if we can
attain accurate distributions. Therefore, Xiao and Yang [7] studied a price and service
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competition of two supply chains with risk-averse retailers under stochastic demand.
They also analyzed the impacts of the retailer’s risk sensitivity on the manufacturers’
equilibrium strategies. Wu et al. [8] considered a joint pricing and quantity competition
between two separate supply chains in random environment and explored the effect of
randomness on the equilibrium behaviors of the supply chain members. Shi et al. [9]
utilized a game-theory-based framework to formulate the power in a supply chain and
examined how power structure and demand indeterminacy affect supply chain members’
performances. Mahmoodi and Eshghi [10] studied this pricing problem in duopoly sup-
ply chains with stochastic demand and explored the effect of competition and demand
indeterminacy intensity on the equilibrium of the structures by a numerical example.
In addition, the others can be described as fuzzy variables if we cannot estimate the
accurate distributions due to the complicated and changeable environments. Fuzzy set
theory has been introduced to the pricing decision game recently. Zhou et al. [11] con-
sidered the pricing decision problem in supply chains composed of a manufacturer and a
retailer under fuzzy environment. Zhao et al. [12, 13] studied the pricing problem of two
substitutable products in supply chains with different structures, in which the consumer
demands and manufacturing costs are described by fuzziness. Following that, Zhao et al.
[14] added the manufacturer service to the pricing problem in a two-echelon fuzzy sup-
ply chain, in which two competitive manufacturers supply two substitutable products to
one common retailer. Liu and Xu [15] and Ke et al. [16] studied the pricing problem of
one product in a fuzzy supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competitive
retailers.
To the best of our knowledge, there are little researches on the supply chain pricing
decision problems with indeterminate factors behaving neither randomness nor fuzzi-
ness. Differing from the literature above, this paper addresses the pricing equilibrium
under circumstances where only belief degree is available by applying uncertainty theory.
Nowadays, uncertainty theory has been well developed in many aspects, such as uncer-
tain set [17], uncertain differential Eq. [18], uncertain sequence [19], etc. Besides, the new
theory has been successfully applied to deal with many uncertain decision-making prob-
lems, e.g., option pricing [20, 21], portfolio selection [22], facility location [23], differential
games [24], project scheduling problem [25–29], supply chain pricing problem [30, 31]
and network problem [32]. Specially, Huang and Ke [33] studied a pricing decision prob-
lem in supply chain with duopoly manufacturers and a common retailer, and explored
the pricing decisions with three different power structures under uncertain environment
by applying uncertainty theory and game theory. Different from the literature above, this
paper considers a pricing problem in two totally separate supply chains and focuses on
pricing decisions with uncertainty at both operational level and strategy level.
For simplicity of analysis, we restrict our research on a pricing problem between two
manufacturers, each of which distributes its product through a single exclusive retailer.
The manufacturers can choose integrated strategy of distributing their products through
a company store (owned by the manufacturer) or through an independent retail outlet
(privately owned). The manufacturers are often much larger than the retailers, hence the
retailers have little power on the wholesale prices. If the manufacturer chooses an inde-
pendent retailer, it may lose control of the sales price. Consequently, the manufacturers
with dominant power choose the wholesale prices while the retailers decide the retail
prices by adding some margins (markup prices). Specifically, the manufacturing costs,
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sales costs and demands are characterized as uncertain variables whose distributions are
estimated by experienced managers’ or marketing experts’ belief degrees. Meanwhile,
Stackelberg and Bertrand models are employed to formulate the pricing decision prob-
lems at operational level. We then derive the equilibrium prices and profits in the three
possible structures from the models. Numerical experiments are also provided to illus-
trate the effects of the uncertain degrees of the parameters on the supply chain members’
pricing decisions and strategy behaviors.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Introductions of uncertainty theory
and uncertain programming model are presented in Section “Preliminaries”. Following
that, some useful notations and necessary assumptions are discussed in Section “Problem
Description”. Three models are employed to derive the equilibria under three possible
scenarios in Section “Models and Solution Approaches”. Afterwards, in Section “Strategy
Decision Analysis”, numerical experiments are applied to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the models and then examine the impacts of uncertain degrees and competing intensity
on equilibrium behaviors both at operational level and strategy level. Some management
highlights and conclusions are discussed in “Conclusions” section.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce some important concepts and theorems of uncertainty
theory for modeling the pricing decision problem with human belief degree. Let  be a
nonempty set and L a σ -algebra over . Each element  in L is called an event.
Definition 1 Liu [1] The set functionM is called an uncertain measure if it satisfies:
Axiom 1 (Normality Axiom)M{} = 1.
Axiom 2 (Duality Axiom)M{} + M{c} = 1 for any event .
Axiom 3 (Subadditivity Axiom) For every countable sequence of events {i}, i =










Besides, the product uncertain measure on the product σ -algebra L was defined by Liu
[34] as follows:
Axiom 4 (Product Axiom) Let (k ,Lk ,Mk) be uncertainty spaces for k = 1, 2, · · · The










where k are arbitrarily chosen events from Lk for k = 1, 2, · · · , respectively.
Definition 2 Liu [1] An uncertain variable is a measurable function ξ from an uncer-
tainty space (,L,M) to the set of real numbers, i.e., for any Borel set B of real numbers,
the set
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{ξ ∈ B} = {γ ∈  ∣∣ ξ(γ ) ∈ B}
is an event.










for any Borel sets B1,B2, · · · ,Bn.
Sometimes, we should know uncertainty distribution to model real-life uncertain
optimization problems.
Definition 4 Liu [1]The uncertainty distribution of an uncertain variable ξ is defined
by
(x) = M{ξ ≤ x}
for any real number x.
An uncertainty distribution  is referred to be regular if its inverse function −1(α)
exists and is unique for each α ∈[ 0, 1].
Lemma 1 Liu [2] Let ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn be independent uncertain variables with regular
uncertainty distributions 1,2, · · · ,n, respectively. If the function f (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is
strictly increasing with respect to x1, x2, · · · , xm and strictly decreasing with respect to
xm+1, xm+2, · · · , xn, then
ξ = f (ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn)
is an uncertain variable with inverse uncertainty distribution
−1(α) = f (−11 (α), · · · ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), · · · ,−1n (1 − α)).








provided that at least one of the above two integrals is finite.
Lemma 2 Liu [2] Let ξ be an uncertain variable with uncertainty distribution . If the








Huang et al. Journal of Uncertainty Analysis and Applications  (2016) 4:8 Page 6 of 21
Lemma 3 Liu [2] Let ξ be an uncertain variable with regular uncertainty distribution









0, x < a
(x − a)/(b − a), a ≤ x ≤ b
1, x > b
(1)





(a + (b − a)α)dα = a + b2 . (2)




0, x < a
(x − a)/2(b − a), a ≤ x ≤ b
(x + c − 2b)/2(c − b), b < x ≤ c
1, x > c
(3)
and its inverse uncertainty distribution is
−1(α) =
{
(1 − 2α)a + 2αb, α < 0.5
(2 − 2α)b + (2α − 1)c, α ≥ 0.5. (4)




((1 − 2α)a + 2αb)dα +
∫ 1
0.5
((2 − 2α)b + (1 − 2α)c)dα = a + 2b + c4 .
(5)
Lemma 4 Liu [35] Let ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξn be independent uncertain variables with regu-
lar uncertainty distributions 1,2, · · · ,n, respectively. A function f (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is
strictly increasing with respect to x1, x2, · · · , xm and strictly decreasing with respect to




f (−11 (α), · · · ,−1m (α),−1m+1(1 − α), · · · ,−1n (1 − α))dα (6)
provided that the expected value E[ ξ ] exists.
Example 3 Let ξ and η be two positive independent uncertain variables with regular
uncertainty distributions  and 











−1(1 − α)dα. (7)
Uncertain programming, as a type of mathematical programming involving uncertain
variables, was initiated by Liu [36]. The general form of uncertain programming is shown
as follows:
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⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
max E[ f (x, ξ)]
subject to:
M{gi(x, ξ) ≤ 0} ≥ αi, i = 1, 2, · · · , p
(8)
where x is a decision vector, ξ is an uncertain vector of parameters, E[ f (x, ξ)] means the
expected value of the objective function while M{gi(x, ξ) ≤ 0} ≥ αi, i = 1, 2, · · · , p, is a
set of chance constraints.
With the above concepts and lemmas, we can model the pricing decision problem in
uncertain environments.
ProblemDescription
We restrict our research on two entirely separate supply chains which distribute differ-
entiated but competing products to the same market. The channel structures are either
vertically integrated or decentralized based on the strategies of the manufacturers. As
shown in Fig. 1, each manufacturer can employ one retailer per market area to retail its
products (Decentralized Strategy); or it can distribute its products to consumers directly
using its own company store (Integrated Strategy). It is assumed that the manufacturers
perform as a Stackelberg leader in each chain (in the case of decentralized strategy) but
there is no dominant power between the two supply chains.
The ith manufacturer (M1 or M2) produces product i at unit cost ci and wholesales the
product to a specified retailer Ri, i = 1, 2. Then the retailer sells the product to consumers
with unit sales cost si. The manufacturer chooses the wholesale price wi while the retailer
decides the sales price pi = wi+ri by adding somemargin (markup price ri) to the whole-
sale price. The consumers are price sensitive and the demand functions are described as
follows:
qi = di − δpi + γ
n∑
j=1,j =i
































Fig. 1 The four channel structures under manufacturers’ different channel strategies
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In this paper, we merely explore two separate supply chains, and then the demand
function can be simplified as follows:
qi = di − (δ + γ )pi + γ p3−i, i = 1, 2
where di is the market base, δ denotes the price-sensitivity of the consumers, γ is the
substitutability of the two products and pi is the sales price of product i. Note that changes
in di alter the relative product preferences. Let β = δ + γ . The above function can be
rewritten as
qi = di − βpi + γ p3−i, i = 1, 2.
This linear demand function is widely applied in supply chain management [5, 37, 38].
Due to the complicated and changeable environment, the price elastic coefficient cannot
be estimated precisely. In many instances, β˜ and γ˜ can be characterized as uncertain
variables.
The notations are listed as follows:
c˜i : unit manufacturing cost of product i
s˜i : unit sales cost of product i
wi: unit wholesale price of product i
ri: unit markup price of product i
pi: unit retail price of product i, where pi = wi + ri
d˜i : market base of product i
qi : demand of product i
πmi : profit of manufacturer i:πmi = (wi − c˜i)qi, i = 1, 2
πri : profit of retailer i:πri = (ri − s˜i)qi, i = 1, 2
Assumption 1 Because the product demand should be more sensitive to changes of its
price than to changes of the other product, it is assumed that the elastic coefficients β˜ and
γ˜ satisfy E[ β˜]> E[ γ˜ ]> 0,M{β˜ < 0} = 0, andM{γ˜ < 0} = 0.
Assumption 2 All the uncertain coefficients are assumed nonnegative and mutually
independent.
Assumption 3 (Full information) The manufacturers and retailers have same informa-
tion and estimations on the demands and the costs of other channel members.
Assumption 4 (Risk neutral) It is assumed that all the channel members are risk neutral
and desire to maximize the expected profits.
Because the costs cannot exceed the retail price and markup, and the demands are
always positive, then we have the following assumption.
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Assumption 5 (Positive assumption) It is assumed that the costs cannot exceed the retail
price and markup, and the demands are always positive, shown as follows:
M{wi − c˜i ≤ 0} = 0, M{ri − s˜i ≤ 0} = 0,
M{pi − c˜i − s˜i ≤ 0} = 0, M{d˜i − β˜pi + γ˜ p3−i ≤ 0} = 0, i = 1, 2. (9)
Let c˜i, s˜i, d˜i, β˜ and γ˜ be positive independent uncertain variables with regular uncer-
tainty distributions ci , si ,di , β , and γ . For simplicity, we define
E[ a˜α b˜α]= ∫ 10 −1a (α)−1b (α)dα, E[ a˜1−α b˜1−α]= ∫ 10 −1a (1 − α)−1b (1 − α)dα,
E[ a˜α b˜1−α]= ∫ 10 −1a (α)−1b (1 − α)dα, E[ a˜1−α b˜α]= ∫ 10 −1a (1 − α)−1b (α)dα
(10)
where −1a and −1b are the inverse uncertainty distributions of uncertain variables a˜ and
b˜, respectively.
Proposition 1 If Assumption 5 holds, the expected profits of the participants can be
transformed as follows:
πmi = − E[ β˜]w2i + E[ γ˜ ]w3−iwi + (−E[ β˜] ri + E[ γ˜ ] r3−i + E[ d˜i]+E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α] )wi
− E[ c˜1−αi d˜i
α]+E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α] ri − E[ c˜i1−αγ˜ α] (r3−i + w3−i),
πri = − E[ β˜] r2i + E[ γ˜ ] r3−iri + (−E[ β˜]wi + E[ γ˜ ]w3−i + E[ d˜i]+E[ s˜1−αi β˜1−α] )ri
− E[ s˜1−αi d˜αi ]+E[ s˜1−αi β˜1−α]wi − E[ s˜1−αi γ˜ α] (r3−i + w3−i), i = 1, 2.
(11)
Proof 1. Let πmi = E[ (wi − c˜i)(d˜i − β˜(ri +wi) + γ˜ (r3−i +w3−i))] , i = 1, 2. Obviously, if
the conditions in Assumption 5 hold, πmi is monotone increasing with d˜i, γ˜ and monotone








[ (wi − c1−αi )(d˜i
α − β1−α(ri + wi) + γ˜ α(r3−i + w3−i))] dα.
(12)
Then
πmi = − E[ β˜]w2i + E[ γ˜ ]w3−iwi + (−E[ β˜] ri + E[ γ˜ ] r3−i + E[ d˜i]+E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α] )wi
− E[ c˜i1−αd˜αi ]+E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α] ri − E[ c˜i1−αγ˜ α] (r3−i + w3−i).
(13)
In the same way, we can get the crisp forms of the expected profit functions πri in
Proposition 1, i = 1, 2.
Models and Solution Approaches
In this section, the uncertain programming models based on Stackelberg and Nash game
theory are employed to derive the equilibrium prices in different channel structures.
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Decentralized Structure (DD)
In the first case, both the chains are decentralized and the competition becomes a
four-members game. The detailed decision sequence is as follows: The two Stackelberg
manufacturers simultaneously announce their wholesale prices wi to maximize their own
profits allowing for the retailers’ optimal responses. Then, the two retailers, performing
as followers, non-cooperatively choose the markup pricing schemes or unit sales com-
mission ri, respectively, to maximize their own profits conditional on the other retailer’s
decision. Then, the retail prices are decided as pi = wi + ri, i = 1, 2, as well as the sales
quantities. It is assumed that the manufacturers and retailers are risk neutral and desire





πm1 = E[ (w1 − c˜1)(d˜1 − β˜(r∗1 + w1) + γ˜ (r∗2 + w2))]
max
w2
πm2 = E[ (w2 − c˜2)(d˜2 − β˜(r∗2 + w2) + γ˜ (r∗1 + w1))]
subject to:
M{wi − c˜i ≤ 0} = 0, i = 1, 2




πr1 = E[ (r1 − s˜1)(d˜1 − β˜(r1 + w1) + γ˜ (r2 + w2))]
max
r2
πr2 = E[ (r2 − s˜2)(d˜2 − β˜(r2 + w2) + γ˜ (r1 + w1))]
subject to:
M{ri − s˜i ≤ 0} = 0
M{d˜i − β˜(ri + wi) + γ˜ (r3−i + w3−i) ≤ 0} = 0, i = 1, 2.
(14)
To solve this Nash-Stackelberg-Nash game model, opposite to the decision sequence,
we should derive the Nash equilibrium in the lower level for the given wholesale prices
w1 and w2 specified by the manufacturers in advance.
Referring to the expected value functions of the retailers with the given wholesale
prices, we can get
∂2πr1(r1, r2)
∂r21
= −2E[ β˜]< 0, ∂
2πr2(r1, r2)
∂r22
= −2E[ β˜]< 0, (15)
with the assumption that E[ β˜]> E[ γ˜ ]> 0. Hence, πr1 and πr2 are concave in r1 and r2,
respectively. Then we can get the Nash equilibrium by setting the first-order derivatives
equaling 0 as follows:
∂πr1
∂r1
= − 2E[ β˜] r1 + E[ γ˜ ] r2 − E[ β˜]w1 + E[ γ˜ ]w2 + E[ d˜1]+E[ s˜1−α1 β˜1−α]= 0,
∂πr2
∂r2
= − 2E[ β˜] r2 + E[ γ˜ ] r1 − E[ β˜]w2 + E[ γ˜ ]w1 + E[ d˜2]+E[ s˜1−α2 β˜1−α]= 0.
(16)
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The followers’ optimal responses to (w1,w2) can be easily obtained by solving the above
two equations as follows:
r∗1(w1,w2) =
−2E[ β˜]2 +E[ γ˜ ]2
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 w1 +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w2+
2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α2 ] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 ,
r∗2(w1,w2) =
−2E[ β˜]2 +E[ γ˜ ]2
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 w2 +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w1+
2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α2 ] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 .
(17)
Given the two retailers’ optimal responses, substituting Eq. (17) into the profit functions
of the manufacturers, we obtain
πmi = E
[









4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2wi +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]





4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w3−i +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2wi + S3−i
))]
= E[ d˜i]wi − 2E[ β˜]
3
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w
2
i −
E[ β˜]2 E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w3−iwi − E[ β˜] Siwi
+ 2E[ β˜]
2 E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w3−iwi +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ 2]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w
2
i + S3−iwi
− E[ c˜1−αi d˜αi ]+E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α]
(
2E[ β˜]2
4E[ β˜]2−E[ γ˜ ]2wi+
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2−E[ γ˜ ]2w3−i+Si
)
− E[ c˜1−αi γ˜ α]
(
2E[ β˜]2
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2w3−i +
E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]





2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜i]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−αi ] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜3−i]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α3−i ] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 , i = 1, 2.
Referring to Eq. (18), we can obtain the second-order derivatives of the equivalent
objective functions πmi as follows:
∂2πmi
∂w2i
= −2E[ β˜] (2E[ β˜]
2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 < 0, i = 1, 2.
Hence, by differentiating πmi and equating the expressions to 0, we have
∂πm1(w1,w2)
∂w1
= −2Aw1 + Bw2 + E[ d˜1]−E[ β˜] S1 + E[ γ˜ ] S2 + C1 = 0,
∂πm2(w1,w2)
∂w2
= −2Aw2 + Bw1 + E[ d˜2]−E[ β˜] S2 + E[ γ˜ ] S1 + C2 = 0,
and the leaders’ equilibrium prices (w1,w2) can be easily obtained by solving the above
two equations
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w∗1 =
2A(E[ d˜1]−E[ β˜] S1 + E[ γ˜ ] S2 + C1) + B(E[ d˜2]−E[ β˜] S2 + E[ γ˜ ] S1 + C2)
4A2 − B2 ,
w∗2 =




A = 2E[ β˜]
3 −E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]2
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 , B =
E[ β˜]2 E[ γ˜ ]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 ,
Ci = 2E[ β˜]
2 E[ c˜1−αi β˜1−α]+E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]E[ ˜c1−αi γ˜ α]
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 , i = 1, 2.
Then, we can get the equilibrium prices of the two retailers as follows:
r∗1 =
(−2E[ β˜]2 +E[ γ˜ ]2 )w∗1 + E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]w∗2 + 2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜ s˜1] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜ s˜2] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 ,
r∗2 =
(−2E[ β˜]2 +E[ γ˜ ]2 )w∗2 + E[ β˜]E[ γ˜ ]w∗1 + 2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜ s˜2] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜ s˜1] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 .
Mixed Structures (DI and ID)
The second possible structure is that one chain is vertically integrated and the other chain
is decentralized. The integrated one can be seen as a manufacturer who retails its product
directly or a retailer who purchases products from its own factory (the wholesale price is
the manufacturing cost).
In this scenario, the number of the competitors reduces to three, stated as inde-
pendent manufacturer (M1), independent retailer (R1) and integrated “manufacturer”
(or integrated “retailer”) (M2). The detailed decision sequence is as follows: the inte-
grated “manufacturer” and the independent manufacturer simultaneously announce the
retail or wholesale prices to maximize their own profits conditional on the retailer’s
response. Then the retailer chooses the most profitable markup. It is assumed that all the





πm1 = E[ (w1 − c˜1)(d˜1 − β˜(r∗1 + w1) + γ˜ p2)]
max
p2
πm2 = E[ (p2 − c˜2 − s˜2)(d˜2 − β˜p2 + γ˜ (r∗1 + w1))]
subject to:
M{w1 − c˜1 ≤ 0} = 0, M{p2 − c˜2 − s˜2 ≤ 0} = 0,
M{d˜2 − β˜p2 + γ˜ (r1 + w1) ≤ 0} = 0




πr1 = E[ (r1 − s˜1)(d˜1 − β˜(r1 + w1) + γ˜ p2)]
subject to:
M{r1 − s˜1 ≤ 0} = 0,
M{d˜1 − β˜(r1 + w1) + γ˜ p2 ≤ 0} = 0.
(20)
Thus, for the given wholesale price w1 and the retail price p2, the optimal response of
R1 in the decentralized chain should be derived firstly. Given (w1, p2), the profit function
of R1 is as follows:
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πr1 = E[ d˜1] r1 − E[ β˜] r21 − E[ β˜]w1r1 + E[ γ˜ ] p2r1 + E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ] r1 − E[ s˜1−α1 d˜α1 ]
+ E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ]w1 − E[ γ˜ α s˜1−α1 ] p2.
(21)
Because the second-order derivative ∂
2πr1 (r1)
∂r21
= −2E[ β˜]< 0, differentiating it and
equating its first-order derivative to 0, we have
r∗1(w1, p2) =
E[ d˜1]+E[ γ˜ ] p2 + E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ]
2E[ β˜]
− 12w1. (22)
With the optimal response of the Stackelberg follower r∗1(w1, p2), the Nash-Stackelberg
equilibrium of the two manufacturers can be obtained. Substituting r∗1(w1, p2) from
Eq. (22) into the profit functions, we have































E[πm2 ] = E[ (p2 − c˜2 − s˜2)
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With the assumption that E[ β˜]> E[ γ˜ ]> 0, we have
∂2πm1(w1)
∂w21









< −2E[ β˜]+2E[ β˜]
2
2E[ β˜]
= −E[ β˜]< 0.
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Therefore, we can get the Nash equilibrium by setting the first-order derivative func-
tions Eq. (24) equaling 0 as follows:
w∗1 =












8E[ β˜]2 −5E[ γ˜ ]2
(































Pure Integrated Structures (II)
When both of the supply chains are vertically integrated, each distributes its product to
consumers through its own channel directly, and then the competition between the two




πm1 = E[ (p1 − c˜1 − s˜1)(d˜1 − β˜p1 + γ˜ p2)]
max
p2
πm2 = E[ (p2 − c˜2 − s˜2)(d˜2 − β˜p2 + γ˜ p1)]
subject to:
M{pi − c˜i − s˜i ≤ 0} = 0, M{d˜i − β˜pi + γ˜ p3−i ≤ 0} = 0, i = 1, 2.
(26)
Similar to the solution approachmentioned in the other models, we should get the crisp
form of the uncertain objective functions first.
πmi = − E[ β˜] p2i + E[ γ˜ ] p3−ipi + E[ d˜i] pi + E[ β˜1−α c˜1−αi ] pi + E[ β˜1−α s˜1−αi ] pi
− E[ c˜1−αi d˜i
α]−E[ s˜1−αi d˜i
α]−E[ c˜1−αi γ˜ α] p3−i + E[ s˜1−αi γ˜ α] p3−i, i = 1, 2.
(27)
From Eq. (27), we can get that the second-order derivatives of the objective functions
∂2πmi
∂p2i
= −2E[ β˜]< 0 with the assumption that E[ β˜]> 0. Therefore, πmi are concave




= −2E[ β˜] p1 + E[ γ˜ ] p2 + E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α1 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ]= 0,
∂πm2(p1, p2)
∂r1
= −2E[ β˜] p2 + E[ γ˜ ] p1 + E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α2 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α2 ]= 0.
The solution can be obtained as follows:
p∗1 =
2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α1 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α2 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α2 ] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 ,
p∗2 =
2E[ β˜] (E[ d˜2]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α2 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α2 ] ) + E[ γ˜ ] (E[ d˜1]+E[ β˜1−α c˜1−α1 ]+E[ β˜1−α s˜1−α1 ] )
4E[ β˜]2 −E[ γ˜ ]2 .
Strategy Decision Analysis
Because of the complicated form of the equilibrium prices and expected profits, numer-
ical examples rather than analytical comparisons are conducted to explore the effect of
the uncertain degrees of the costs and demands on equilibrium prices. Without loss of
generality of the conclusion, a series of experiments are conducted. As the results from
different experiments are somewhat coherent, we present only one of them in this part.
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Consider the case from Zhao et al. [12] that both the unit manufacturing costs are
between 7 and 10, and most likely 8, the sales costs are between 2 and 5, and most likely
4, the market bases of the two products are both about 800, the elasticity coefficient β˜
is about 80 and γ˜ is about 50. These linguist estimations can be denoted as uncertain
variables with distributions shown in Table 1.













(700(1 − α) + 900α)((1 − 2(1 − α)) ∗ 2 + (2(1 − α)) ∗ 4)dα
= 2950
(28)
Similarly, we can get that the values of E[ c˜1−α1 β˜1−α] ,E[ c˜1−α1 γ˜ α] ,E[ c˜1−α1 d˜1
α] ,
E[ s˜1−α1 β˜1−α] and E[ s˜1−α1 γ˜ α] are 665.00,407.50,6550.00,305.00 and 182.50, respectively.
Note that E[ s˜1−α1 d˜1
α] = E[ s˜1]E[ d˜1]. Different from independent random variables, the
expected value of the product of two uncertain variables does not only depend on the
expected value of each variable, but also on their distributions. Thus, the distributions
of the uncertain parameters may have great influences on the pricing decisions. One
may concern that how the uncertainty of the parameters affects the pricing decisions in
operational level and the channel structure decisions in strategy level. The uncertainty
or uncertain degree, defined by the distributions or ranges of uncertain variables which
mainly depends on experts’ personal knowledge and also the accessibility and availabil-
ity of the information concerning the uncertain parameters. More information about
the parameters is available, more accurate estimations the experts can make, and con-
sequently, distributions with smaller ranges can be attained and the uncertain degrees
of the parameters will become lower. These results below can help the managers under-
standmore about the pricing decisions with limited information and also help themmake
decisions in strategy level.
Effects of Uncertain Degrees on Pricing Decisions
First of all, we analyze the effects of the uncertain degrees of price elastic coefficients β˜ , γ˜ ,
the manufacturing costs c˜1, c˜2 and sales costs s˜1, s˜2 on optimal pricing decisions under
the three possible structures. By varying the uncertain degrees of these parameters and
keeping the other parameters unchanged, the changes of optimal prices are shown in
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Table 1 Uncertain variables
Parameters Linguist description Uncertainty distribution Expected value
β˜ About 80 L(70, 90) 80
γ˜ About 50 L(40, 60) 50
c˜1, c˜2 Between 7 and 10, and most likely 8 Z(7, 8, 10) 8.25
s˜1, s˜2 Between 2 and 5, and most likely 4 Z(2, 4, 5) 3.75
d˜1, d˜2 About 800 L(700, 900) 800
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Table 2 Effects of β˜ ’s uncertain degrees on the prices under the three structures
Structure DD DI II








L(80, 80) 10.7648 7.0642 17.8289 8.1780 8.2140 16.3920 17.3695 16.0000
L(75, 85) 10.7607 7.0880 17.8487 8.1929 8.2371 16.4300 17.4173 16.0455
L(70, 90) 10.7567 7.1118 17.8685 8.2078 8.2602 16.4680 17.4651 16.0909
L(65, 95) 10.7527 7.1356 17.8883 8.2228 8.2833 16.5061 17.5129 16.1364
Remark 1 The uncertain variable L(a, b) degenerates to a real number when a = b. A
real number is a special uncertain variable.
Referring to Table 2, we can find when the uncertain degree of parameter β˜ increases,
the markup prices and retail prices will increase slightly while the wholesale prices will
drop slightly in the pure decentralized structure. The wholesale price, markup price and
retail price of the decentralized chain increase as well as the retail price of the inte-
grated chain in the mixed structure. The retail prices of the pure integrated structure will
decrease when the uncertain degree decreases.
Referring to Table 3, we find that the uncertain degree of the parameter γ˜ has no impact
on the price decisions in the pure decentralized and integrated structures. The partici-
pants in the mixed structures, however, either in the decentralized chain or integrated
chain, pursue higher prices when the uncertain degree increases.
Referring to Tables 4 and 5:
• The wholesale price, markup price and retail price will increase while the markup
price of the retailer in the other chain will drop when the uncertain degree of the
manufacturing cost increases in the pure decentralized structure.
• The retail price in the pure integrated structure as well as the price in the other chain
will decrease when the uncertain degree of the manufacturing cost decreases.
• The manufacturer in the decentralized chain will choose a lower wholesale price,
which in turn leads to a lower retail price when the uncertain degree of its
manufacturing cost increases.
From Tables 6 and 7:
• The wholesale price, markup price, and retail price will increase when the uncertain
degree of the sales cost increases while the wholesale price of the manufacturer in the
other chain will drop in the pure decentralized structures.
• The wholesale price, markup price, and retail price in the mixed structure will drop
slightly when the uncertain degree of the sales cost decreases, either in the
decentralized chain or integrated chain.
Table 3 Effects of γ˜ ’s uncertain degrees on the prices under the three structures
Structure DD DI II









L(50, 50) 10.7567 7.1118 17.8685 8.1998 8.2561 16.4559 17.4393 16.0909
L(45, 55) 10.7567 7.1118 17.8685 8.2038 8.2582 16.4620 17.4522 16.0909
L(40, 60) 10.7567 7.1118 17.8685 8.2078 8.2602 16.4680 17.4651 16.0909
L(35, 65) 10.7567 7.1118 17.8685 8.2119 8.2622 16.4741 17.4780 16.0909
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Table 4 Effects of manufacturing costs’ uncertain degrees on the prices under the pure

















L(8.25, 8.25) 10.7542 7.1107 17.8648 10.7436 7.1172 17.8608 16.0801 16.0563
L(7.25, 9.25) 10.7559 7.1114 17.8673 10.7523 7.1136 17.8659 16.0873 16.0794
L(6.25, 10.25) 10.7576 7.1122 17.8697 10.7611 7.1100 17.8711 16.0945 16.1025
L(5.25, 11.25) 10.7592 7.1129 17.8722 10.7698 7.1064 17.8762 16.1017 16.1255
• The sales price in the pure integrated structure will decrease with the decrease of the
uncertain degree of the sales cost as well as the price in the other chain.
The other numerical examples show the same results with the above one. Similar to the
numerical experiments above, more experiments can also be conducted to explore the
impacts of uncertain degrees of the other parameters on the prices and profits of the two
supply chains.
Equilibrium Analysis of Structure Strategies
In this part, we explore what effects the uncertain degree of the market bases and com-
peting intensity of the two products might have on the structure of the two competing
supply chains.
In consideration of the equilibrium expected profits of the manufacturers at opera-
tional level under different structures and competing intensities, we can examine whether
there is any economic incentive for a manufacturer to switch from integrated structure
(I) to decentralized structure (D) in an industry where a pure decentralized structure is
more profitable than a pure vertically integrated structure. A point which should not be
neglected is that the expected profits are not comparably attained from different intensi-
ties, but we can only contrast the expected profits in different structures with the same
competing intensities.
In the experiments, the price elasticity coefficients β˜ and γ˜ degenerate to crisp num-
bers, and the other data keep the same with the above experiments. Let β remain
unchanged as 80 and vary γ from 0 to 80, i.e., the competing intensity θ = γ
β
varies from
0 to 1. The results attained from the above three models in different scenarios are shown
in Fig. 2.
From Fig. 2, the following results are obtained:
• If θ ≤ θ1, both the manufacturers will choose vertically integrated channel structure.
Therefore, the two manufacturers can reach a Nash equilibrium in the strategy level
by keeping vertically integrated.
• For θ1 < θ < θ2, even though a pure decentralized structure can make the two
manufacturers more profitable, the equilibrium of the two manufacturers is to keep
















L(8.25, 8.25) 8.2371 8.2435 16.4806 17.4587 L(8.25, 8.25) 8.1909 8.2517 16.4426 17.4109
L(7.25, 9.25) 8.2176 8.2546 16.4722 17.4630 L(7.25, 9.25) 8.2022 8.2573 16.4595 17.4470
L(6.25, 10.25) 8.1981 8.2657 16.4638 17.4673 L(6.25, 10.25) 8.2135 8.2630 16.4765 17.4832
L(5.25, 11.25) 8.1786 8.2768 16.4554 17.4716 L(5.25, 11.25) 8.2248 8.2687 16.4935 17.5194
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L(3.75, 3.75) 10.7504 7.1090 17.8594 10.7867 7.0627 17.8494 16.0801 16.0563
L(2.75, 4.75) 10.7546 7.1109 17.8655 10.7667 7.0954 17.8621 16.0873 16.0794
L(1.75, 5.25) 10.7588 7.1127 17.8715 10.7467 7.1282 17.8749 16.0945 16.1025
L(0.75, 6.25) 10.7630 7.1146 17.8776 10.7267 7.1609 17.8876 16.1017 16.1255
vertically integrated. Given that both are decentralized, there is an economic incentive
for the manufacturer moving to a vertically integrated structure. Thus, if the structure
is hybrid, there is also an economic incentive for the integrated manufacturer selling
through a company store. In other words, when the competing intensity is between
(θ1, θ2), the two manufacturers may somewhat fall into a prisoner’s dilemma.
• Consequently, for θ ≥ θ2, the unique equilibrium of the two manufacturers is to keep
decentralized ignoring the competitor’s structure.
The results have very intuitive highlight that if the products are highly competitive (the
case that the two products are highly substitutable θ > θ2), the manufacturers in duopoly
supply chains are better off to choose an independent retailer to distribute their prod-
ucts rather than through company stores even though they can do it as efficiently as the
privately-owned. This is in line with equilibriums concluded in McGuire and Staelin [3]
in deterministic environment.
By the way, what we care most is the effect of the uncertain parameters on the equi-
librium behaviors. In order to explore how the uncertain degrees impact the equilibrium
behavior, another experiment is provided to make a contrast between the uncertain envi-
ronment and deterministic environment. We examine the influence of the uncertainty on
the equilibrium behaviors of the two manufacturers, and the result is presented in Fig. 3.
Referring to Fig. 3, we can find that θUncertain2 > θDeteministic2 , θUncertain1 > θDeteministic1 ,
illustrating that both in uncertain environment and deterministic environment, the
duopoly manufacturers are better off to distribute their products through a decentralized
channel rather than an integrated one when the competing intensity is higher than some
value. Furthermore, uncertain environment will make the value higher than the one in
deterministic environment.
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a pricing competing problem with two competing supply
chains, each of which consists of a manufacturer and a single exclusive retailer and dis-
tributes differentiated but competing products in the same market. The manufacturing
costs, sales costs, and demands were characterized as uncertain variables which is more
















L(3.75, 3.75) 8.1746 8.2435 16.4181 17.4587 L(3.75, 3.75) 8.1909 8.2517 16.4426 17.4109
L(2.75, 4.75) 8.1968 8.2546 16.4514 17.4630 L(2.75, 4.75) 8.2022 8.2573 16.4595 17.4470
L(1.75, 5.25) 8.2189 8.2657 16.4847 17.4673 L(1.75, 5.25) 8.2135 8.2630 16.4765 17.4832
L(0.75, 6.25) 8.2411 8.2768 16.5179 17.4716 L(0.75, 6.25) 8.2248 8.2687 16.4935 17.5194
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Fig. 2 The equilibrium expected profits under the different channel structures with different competing
intensities
in line with the real-life problem. Meanwhile, uncertainty theory and game-theory-based
models were employed to formulate the pricing decision problems. The equilibrium
behaviors of the participants at the operational level under three possible scenarios are
derived from these models.
Numerical experiments were also given to explore the impact of uncertain degree of
the parameters on the pricing decisions. The results demonstrated that these supply
chain uncertain factors have great influences on the decision makers and sometimes they
choose higher prices while sometimes they decide lower ones when the uncertain degree
increases. In addition,We also illustrated the effects of competing intensity (substitutabil-
ity) of the two products on the strategy behaviors in vertically integrated structure versus
decentralized structure, of the manufacturers. It was found that the manufacturers are
better off to distribute their products through a decentralized channel rather than an inte-
grated one if the products are highly competitive. Specially, the uncertain environment
will reduce the competition and increase some specific value of the competing intensity
of the products, higher than which the duopoly manufacturers are better off to choose
decentralized.








































Fig. 3 The equilibrium competing intensity in uncertain and deterministic environments
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This paper focused on only one type of indeterminacy, while the real world might
behave more complicated in which randomness and uncertainty might co-exist. There-
fore, one possible extension of this paper is to study the pricing problem with twofold
indeterminacy, in which uncertain random variable can be applied. In addition, this paper
only considered the dealership structures, and future researches can be focused on some
more complicated channel structures, containing multiple manufacturers and retailers.
Besides, this paper assumed that all the participants are risk neutral while the decision-
makers may be risk sensitive in the real world. The research can be more applicable if the
equilibrium behaviors with risk-sensitive members are considered.
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